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Abstract. Although consolation is one of the classic religious subjects it plays 
no role in the current debate about religious emotions. One reason for this 
neglect could be that this debate is mostly based on classical emotions such 
as joy and fear, love and hope, and that consolation is not understood as 
an emotion. This paper tries to show that consolation in fact can and should 
be seen as an  emotion. After naming and refuting some reasons that speak 
against taking consolation to be an emotion, I will explain how consolation can 
be positively conceptualized as an emotion within a recent theory of emotions. 
It will be decisive to see that the experience of consolation can be understood 
not only hedonistically-qualitatively, but also intentionally. This structural 
conception allows for a differentiated description of various types of consolation 
as an emotion, also, in the tradition of William James, of a secular as well as 
a religious form of consolation.
Consolation is one of the classic religious subjects. In Christianity 
in particular, consolation is regarded as a  central experience that is 
available to the believer through her faith. Consolation is familiar from 
the Holy Scripture, where God is also identified as the great consoler. 
One psalm, for instance, says: ‘My flesh and my heart may fail, but God 
is the strength of my heart and my portion forever.’1 2 This fits with 
a perspective wherein all human life is regarded as in need of consolation 
1 Psalm 73.26.
2 Or in a letter of Paul’s to the Thessalonians: ‘Now our Lord Jesus Christ himself, and 
God, even our Father, who hath loved us, and hath given us everlasting consolation and 
good hope through grace.’ 2 Thessalonians 2.16.
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and God, as the Other of everything mundane, as a source of consolation. 
Christians are also familiar with consolation from Christian practice, in 
which it is important to provide consolation out of charity, and one can 
rely on being consolidated by one’s neighbour or parish in times of need. 
Pastoral care, i.e. being there for someone else who is in need, is a much-
discussed area of theology.
Given this briefly sketched central role of consolation in religion, it is 
surprising that it plays no role in the lively debate about religious feelings 
and emotions.3 Shouldn’t consolation be an  example par excellence in 
this area? Is it not, besides reverence, one of the particularly striking 
examples of emotional religious experiences? Does its double meaning 
not show that its role is particularly relevant: as a concrete experience 
of consolation that someone can offer us in cases of smaller and greater 
suffering; and as an aspect of the way of life that belief facilitates – i.e. 
living with the consolation that God provides, given the flawed human 
existence that everybody somehow experiences as painful?
When wondering why consolation has been neglected in the current 
debate despite its obvious significance, the following suspicion might 
arise: consolation is ignored in the debate about religious feelings, 
because this debate is mostly based on classical emotions such as joy and 
fear, love and hope. Consolation is not understood as a classical emotion. 
At the same time, nobody has understood it as a  religious feeling sui 
generis before, in the way that, for instance, Otto took the numinous 
to be a  religious feeling, or Schleiermacher the principal dependency. 
The reason might be that consolation is understood as a  very general 
phenomenon that is not specifically religious in the same way as the 
emotional experiences just mentioned are thought to be.
Regardless of what the exact reasons for ignoring consolation might 
have been, I think that due to its significance, it is an important task to 
establish consolation as a subject in the debate about religious feelings. 
Consolation should be introduced to this debate as an  emotion that 
should be investigated in its specifically religious characteristics. One 
could also address it as a fundamental experience that might help explain 
what constitutes religious experience and life.
3 There is no individual publication about the topic, and the keyword ‘consolation’ 
can also not be found in any overviews. See, e.g., J. Corrigan, The Oxford Handbook 
of Religion and Emotion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). In the following 
I take ‘feeling’ as the broad term that includes all experiences that are felt and emotion as 
a special kind of those, as will be explained later on.
173CONSOLATION – AN UNRECOGNIZED EMOTION
I am mostly interested in the first type of investigation. In the tradition 
of William James, I assume that many emotions can have a secular as 
well as a religious form.4 I will not consider the question of whether there 
are specifically religious emotional experiences that have no secular 
counterpart in this article.
If consolation is to be introduced into the debate about religious 
feelings, the first and obvious task is to clarify whether consolation can 
be taken to be an emotion in a secular understanding at all – prior to 
discussing its specifically religious characteristics. There is hardly any 
material available about this question in the relevant disciplines. The 
philosophy of emotions has neglected the phenomenon, as too have 
theoretical theology and the neighbouring sciences such as psychology 
and sociology. Hence I  will make this the question of my text: is 
consolation an emotion?
If you look at recent publications from research about emotions, 
you will find as little there as on a  list of passions from the history of 
philosophy.5 Traditional examples of emotions are joy and sorrow, anger 
and jealousy, envy and fear. Consolation is never addressed on its own. It 
is, at least, mentioned in connection with emotions, because consolation 
is doubtlessly related to sorrow, which is a  classical emotion. But can 
consolation itself be understood as an emotion, despite the impression 
given by a perusal of the relevant literature?
I would like to answer this question affirmatively: yes, consolation can 
be taken to be an emotion. Consolation is an emotional phenomenon, 
and a  certain aspect of it was simply ignored in most debates about 
emotions. I want to describe this aspect here and show why we can – and 
should – consider consolation as an emotion due to this aspect.
The structure of my paper is as follows: I will first name the reasons 
that speak against taking consolation to be an emotion and show how 
these reasons can be refuted. I  will then explain how consolation can 
be positively conceptualized as an  emotion within a  recent theory of 
4 William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press 1985), p. 31.
5 C. Newmark, Pathos - Affekt - Gefühl. Philosophische Theorien der Emotionen 
zwischen Aristoteles und Kant (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), pp. 225 ff. For a recent ‘list of 
emotions’ see, e.g., the table of contents for C. Demmerling, and H. Landweer, Philosophie 
der Gefühle. Von Achtung bis Zorn (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2007). Nothing can be found 
either in Robert C. Roberts, Emotions. An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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emotions. It will be decisive to see that the experience of consolation 
can be understood not only hedonistically-qualitatively, but also 
intentionally. In consolation, one finds something or someone consoling. 
This structural conception allows for a  differentiated description of 
various types of consolation as an emotion. I will also explain why we 
can talk about secular as well as religious consolation.
I. WHY CONSOLATION IS ALLEGEDLY NOT AN EMOTION
1.1. Reasons against consolation as an emotion
I  will name three reasons that speak against taking consolation to be 
an emotion. I have already mentioned the first one in the introduction: 
consolation is not even considered to be an  emotion in any of the 
common theories of emotions. This is at least made clear in compilations 
of emotions from Aristotle to Kant.6 In contemporary literature, 
consolation can also neither be found in indices nor chapter headings, 
and only very seldom en passant in chapters about mourning or similar 
subjects.7 This is true for the philosophical literature as well as – as far as 
I can see – psychology and neurosciences that have started to intensively 
investigate feelings since the renaissance of the theory of emotions at the 
end of the 20th century.8
Only in theology, especially in Christian theology, can one find many 
publications about consolation  – but not, as previously mentioned, in 
theoretical debates about religious feelings; rather in the area of practical 
theology. This is why one might put forward a  second reason against 
6 See footnote 1. The situation in the time ‘between Kant and Kenny’ is a bit more 
unclear, Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion and Will (London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1963). In the 19th century, with the differentiation of the sciences, research on 
emotions was increasingly a  subject for psychology. Nietzsche and Freud discussed 
consolation in their respective critiques of religion without being explicitly interested 
in the phenomenon as an  emotion. In the phenomenology of the early 20th century, 
consolation is not mentioned.
7 One of the few places in recent monographs on philosophical research about 
emotions where consolation is mentioned – although not discussed as an emotion in 
itself – is the analysis of Gustav Mahler’s Rückert-Lieder in Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals 
of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
pp. 281 ff.
8 One example are the popular books by the neurologist Antonio Damasio. Antonio 
Damasio, Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow and the Feeling Brain (New York: Harcourt, 
2003); Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error (New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994).
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taking consolation to be an  emotion. On closer inspection, these are 
either texts that are meant to be directly consoling themselves, such 
as psalms (and their explanations) and songs. Or they are texts about 
pastoral care. These texts are about consolation, but primarily about how 
to console someone, and not about what consolation is and specifically 
not about the question whether consolation is an  emotion or not. In 
this respect, they resemble the few texts from the history of philosophy 
where consolation is a topic: consoling writings from antiquity such as 
the ones by Seneca and Boethius. In this sense, consolation can also be 
found today in a scientific disciple that might be surprising at first: in 
nursing theory.9 On closer inspection, it is of course easy to see why: 
nursing is an activity where offering consolation plays a huge role. So in 
these disciplines, consolation takes place, but not as a  feeling that one 
would experience. Consolation is understood as consoling here, it is 
about offering consolation, about an attitude.10
Now one could say that we simply have to distinguish between 
two perspectives on consolation. On the one hand, we can talk about 
consolation in the sense of ‘offering consolation’ or causing consolation. 
On the other hand, we can talk about consolation in the sense of ‘receiving 
consolation’ or actually feeling consolation, so we can talk about a feeling 
here. Is the state into which a consoling person moves a suffering person, 
a feeling or, to be more precise, an emotion?11 It is not that simple. Given 
this scenario, one could put forward a third reason against my thesis. The 
consolation that one receives, one could say, means the end of mourning 
or similar irksome emotions such as desperation, misfortune, pain. 
Finding consolation thus would mean that the mourning disappears. Or 
maybe the mourning does not even have to disappear, and forgetting or 
repressing it suffices. In any case, consolation here means, it seems, the 
absence of (certain) emotions rather than the presence of an emotion. 
One could even go further and say that it is in fact the absence of many 
or even all emotions. Consolation could be the intermediate state or 
phase between mourning and new joy about something else. Being 
9 See, e.g., F. Gilje, and A.-G. Talseth, ‘Mediating Consolation with Suicidal Patients’, 
Nursing Ethics, 14:4 (2007), 546-557.
10 In medical ethics, the notion of consolation can also be found, but in the sense 
of offering consolation. Going back to antiquity, it is then understood as a virtue. See 
W. T. Reich, ‘From ancient consolation and negative care to modern empathy and the 
neurosciences’, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 33 (2012), 25-32 (pp. 26f.).
11 I will explain the difference between feelings and emotions below.
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consoled in this sense would be a sigh of relief. A neutral state in which 
one does not really feel anything at all. Any considerations that merely 
regard consolation as the end of mourning and other similar emotions 
point at least indirectly in this direction.12
These are the reasons that speak against taking consolation to be 
an emotion. They confirm a tradition in which it is also not considered 
as an emotion. But these arguments do not seem very strong to me. I will 
now show how to reply to them.
1.2. Why the counter-reasons are not convincing
The reply to the first reason is simple: referring to tradition is not 
enough. Just because everyone has always thought so does not mean that 
they were right. The first of them might not have looked hard enough, 
and many followed, got used to it or found no cause to question the 
assumption.
If we do question the assumption, however, there is a good reason 
for also considering the interpretation of consolation as a  consoling 
activity as misguided, just as neglecting the description of the state that 
is the aim of consoling is a mistake. This view is at least too limited and 
obscures the view on an interesting phenomenon. I want to go further 
here and claim that we cannot really understand what it means to 
console unless we clarify what happens with the person who receives 
consolation. Consoling does not tell us what consolation is. We have to 
understand what consolation is in order to understand what it means to 
offer consolation – and how to best do that.
I  will later show how exactly consolation is to be understood as 
an  emotion (and not just as a  certain non-emotional state). For now, 
I would merely like to point out that the concept of consolation is no 
exception concerning the fact that it can be both offered and experienced. 
One can bring joy and also feel joy. One difference might be that one can 
bring joy in many different ways, but this is more similar to causing it, 
whereas this is not the case with consoling. When offering consolation, 
the action itself is more specific and more closely connected with the 
consolation that is its aim. Hence it is more important for consolation 
that there is a consoling person. For other emotions, an engaged person is 
less necessary as a cause. A sunny morning is sufficient for joy. However, 
even in consolation one might not depend entirely on another person. 
12 One example is Nussbaum’s interpretation of the Rückert-Lieder. See footnote 3.
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Even here, the weather or a musical work might play a role. I will come 
back to this point. For now, I just wanted to show that the complementary 
structure of giving and receiving also applies to classical emotions. So 
the fact that consolation has, in most cases, only been discussed in the 
sense of offering consolation is no reason for insisting that consolation 
can only be an action and not a feeling.
Now to the third point. How is the state that consoling aims to bring 
about, how is the consolation that someone who is desperate seeks, to 
be understood? Is it a non-emotional, neutral state as suggested above? 
Is it the state ‘after’ mourning, desperation and the like? Does finding 
consolation, finishing mourning, or leaving it behind, mean that one has 
escaped the grasp of emotion? That does not seem plausible to me. I will 
explain this with the analysis of a  rather general example. I  will then 
substantiate my thesis with the basis of a theory of emotions.13
Imagine a classical situation where consolation is needed. Someone 
loses someone who is close to her, for instance in a  car accident. She 
is desperate, angry at the guilty driver or at fate, and, most of all, very 
sad about her loss. After the worst few days that she mostly spends in 
shock, she is in need of consolation. How is this wish for consolation 
to be understood? There are at least two possibilities. Does this person 
want to overcome her mourning? Does she want the mourning to simply 
stop so she can be happy again, like before? Or does she want to be able 
to deal with the mourning, i.e. with her loss – which means, does she 
want to change the state of suffering, but not simply get rid of it? The 
second answer seems right to me. Mourning contains an appreciation of 
what was lost, or in this example, of who died. Simply getting rid of the 
mourning would then mean to somehow deny the appreciation. This is 
surely something the mourning person (at least usually) does not want to 
do. Hence the wish for consolation should not be directly understood as 
the wish for the mourning to end. It is rather plausible to understand the 
desire for consolation as the desire for an altered emotional state, and not 
for the end of negative emotions. If we think this is an understandable 
desire, then consolation has to be seen as an emotional state on its own. 
Someone who is desiring consolation wants to feel consolation.
13 The main thought of the following arguments about consolation as an  emotion 
I have already presented – in a shorter version - in Eva Weber-Guskar, ‘Religious Emotions 
as Experiences of Transcendency? The Example of Consolation’, in Theologie der Gefühle, 
eds. R. Barth and C. Zarnow (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, forthcoming).
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Some might find this view unconvincing and argue that consolation 
is an  emotionally neutral state by presenting a  different example. If 
a child hurts his knee while playing, the child runs to his father crying, 
because he wants to be consoled. This is easily done by the father by 
putting a band-aid on the wound, saying a few nice words and offering 
a chocolate. The child stops crying and runs back to the other children in 
order to continue playing. Here, one might think, being consoled indeed 
means getting rid of pain and being happy again.
However, strictly speaking, a  case like this needs to be described 
differently. In this case, too, finding consolation does not simply mean 
getting rid of the pain. The pain in the child’s knee might last all afternoon 
and only stop in the evening. Long before that, he has already played 
with the others again. The attention and friendly words of the father, 
the fact that he hugged the child, enabled the child to bear the pain and 
to find it not terrible enough to stop him from playing. Consolation 
consists in not completely erasing negative emotions in this case, too, 
but in changing them in a way so one can deal with them.
It does not matter that in one case, with the adult, the pain is mental 
and in the other case physical. Not only does the child’s knee hurt, he 
is also shocked by the constraint in playing that the pain imposes, he is 
sad that he can no longer run like before. The physical pain is, as it were, 
accompanied by mental pain. The pain is lessened by making it clear to 
the child: you can still play, you just cannot run like before and not as 
easily.
Even if one is not convinced by this example, one could just regard 
it as a different variant of consoling and come back to the first example 
and show that there is at least also a variant of consoling that leads to 
consolation in the sense suggested by me: to an emotional state on its own. 
If you suddenly lose your partner in a car accident, it is just impossible 
to simply get over his death and to be as happy as before. This is not only 
because of what one wants – as I  said above – but because of what is 
possible for a person in her emotional integrity. The exact consequences 
of such a denial of appreciation would be worth an  investigation. But 
I would even go further in cases of dramatic losses and the attempt to 
get rid of the corresponding mourning: not only is the question how 
people want to express their appreciation for someone or something who 
was lost at stake here, but also their ability to evaluate or to be aware of 
what is valuable (and to what extent) to them. For this quick dissolution 
of mourning would mean to suddenly erase a very important point of 
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orientation in one’s personal value-landscape. It is possible, however, 
even after such strokes of fate, to organize oneself anew inside, to be 
a person who can continue to live with the loss.14 And this means to find 
consolation. Consolation is not the dissolution of mourning, but a change 
of the emotional surroundings of mourning and hence an emotion on its 
own (which only depends on mourning or a misfortune).15
These are the arguments against the first reasons why consolation 
should not be considered as an emotion. Now I want to explain in more 
detail why consolation can be described as a type of emotion, based on 
a theory of emotions.
II. CONSOLATION AS AN EMOTION
2.1. Emotions as a type of feeling
In order to show more precisely why consolation is an  emotion, 
a very brief explanation of what emotions are is required – beyond the 
evidence that a simple comparison with the examples of joy, anger, etc., 
might provide.
By emotion, I  mean  – drawing on a  well-known stance in 
contemporary philosophical discussion  – a  certain type of intentional 
state, namely, a state whose reference to the world is affective. Emotions 
exhibit a  qualitative experiential dimension.16 This dimension is what 
distinguishes emotions from other intentional states such as beliefs and 
desires. They differ from other affective states by their specific type of 
intentionality beyond the affective dimension. Bodily sensations, such as 
an itch, are restricted to the limits of the body. Moods like melancholia 
14 E.g., the theologian Langenhorst also writes in this sense: ‘Offering consolation, 
that is enabling (encouraging, accompanying, facilitating or stimulating) the mourning 
person to take further steps with better hope towards the future her way through life with 
her mourning – be it in lament, rebellion or acceptance.’ G. Langenhorst, Trösten lernen? 
Profil, Geschichte und Praxis von Trost als diakonischer Lehr- und Lernprozeß (Ostfildern: 
Schwabenverlag, 2000), p. 18.
15 This new constellation might, in the end, also lead to completely overcoming 
mourning, but first it facilitates a life with a certain variant of mourning.
16 An overview of the recent research in this field is, e.g.,: Sabine Döring, ‘Einleitung’, 
in Sabine Döring, ed., Philosophie der Gefühle (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2009), 
pp. 12-65. And: Peter Goldie, ed., Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Emotion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). My own approach can be found in Eva Weber-Guskar, 
Die Klarheit der Gefühle. Was es heißt, Emotionen zu verstehen (Berlin/ New York: Walter 
de Gruyter, 2009), especially Chapter 1.
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or euphoria are less precise concerning their reference to the world. If 
you are sad, you can point out the reason or at least a trigger. If you are 
melancholic, everything appears in a dim light, and you do not know 
why exactly. The core definition of emotions should then be: emotions 
are qualitatively experienced attitudes in which we (kind of) perceive 
something in the world as, in a certain way, valuable for us. If I am sad, 
this means that I  understand something in the world, in an  irksome 
feeling, as  – in some way  – bad for me. To be more precise: I  mostly 
understand it as a  loss, as something that takes something important 
out of my life. Something presses me to the ground, makes my life 
difficult. Getting up is already difficult, and maybe every step is difficult 
throughout the whole day.
These formulations, starting from the aspect of intentionality, must 
not be misunderstood concerning the question of whether emotions can 
only be taken seriously as epistemological categories. In some respects, 
emotions are often compared with perceptions, but are not equated with 
them. It is part of an emotion to be affected by something and to stand 
in a relationship to something other in the world. We could say: they are 
moments of a way of being involved in the world.17 Being involved in the 
world goes far beyond propositional perception.
Besides this core definition, there are further aspects belonging to the 
explanation of emotions. I want to mention two more: firstly, very often, 
emotions contain motivations to act – or are at least connected to them. 
In the case of mourning, this would be to withdraw from the world, or 
at least from a happy party. Secondly, emotions are most often shown 
in a bodily expression. We all know what a sad face looks like. This is 
not only one of the facial expressions that are universally recognized, as 
Ekman has shown.18 It seems to be a gestalt psychological form that we 
think we recognize in other beings, even in unconscious beings, or at 
least we read it into them. Think of sad dog eyes or the droopy twigs of 
a weeping willow.
If we take these features to be basic for an emotion, is the state into 
which the consoling person puts a suffering person then to be described 
17 The formulations about feelings or ‘feeling involved in something’ can also be found, 
as a quote by Agnes Heller and then further developed in H. Steinfath, Orientierung am 
Guten: praktisches Überlegen und die Konstitution von Personen (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 2001), p. 117.
18 See, e.g., P. Ekman, Gefühle lesen. Wie Sie Emotionen erkennen und richtig 
interpretieren (Heidelberg: Spektrum, 2004).
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as an emotion? With the help of the three main features that I mentioned 
I will show that this can indeed be done.
2.2 Consolation as a specific type of emotion
Phenomenality
By contrasting the state of being consoled with the state of being relieved 
and its phenomenal dimension, we can illustrate that consolation has 
a phenomenality. Consolation and relief resemble each other by having 
a similar situation as their precondition – namely mourning, desperation, 
pain or another misfortune and a  movement away from it. But apart 
from this circumstance, consolation and relief differ. Relief is felt as 
a  complete relaxation, a  feeling of being liberated and, literally, being 
light – like ‘taking a load of one’s mind’. It occurs and is appropriate if you 
learn, for instance, that the child that you thought was badly hurt in the 
bus accident was the only child who survived unharmed. Consolation, 
however, is felt as ceasing pressure and similar sensations, but only as 
a  relaxation up to a certain point. It is not a  complete relaxation. The 
feeling can be associated with a warm, dark place, where one can feel at 
home – but not with a bright place that is part of the joy that can follow 
after a complete relief. Consolation is, as the example illustrates, not the 
end of mourning and misfortune, but a change of these dark feelings.
Motivation to act
Someone who has found consolation usually exhibits certain motivations 
to act. They differ from those of someone who is (still) mourning and 
those who have completely finished mourning. We can find many 
explanations of this in, for example, Seneca. In a  long letter, the stoic 
philosopher gives recommendations to a  mother, Marcia, who is 
mourning over the death of her son.19 This seems to be a behaviour that 
fits with consolation as an altered form of mourning. If you are deeply 
in mourning, you probably do not want to let go of the thought of the 
person, but in a  problematic sense, namely not completely accepting 
her death. For instance, you might not want her room to be touched or 
used by anyone. You stick to rituals you had together, but that no longer 
make any sense now. The other extreme would be to completely leave the 
19 Seneca, ‘Trostschrift an Marcia’, in Vom glückseligen Leben, H. Schmidt (Stuttgart: 
Kröner, 1956), pp. 119-158.
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mourning behind and to not care at all what happens to the room and 
the rituals. In such a case, finding consolation means to be able to honour 
and keep memories, but to still continue one’s life in a  new way. This 
could be manifested by keeping the furniture in the room, but letting 
someone who needs it, use it. You can only do this (without emotional 
distortions) if the mourning has changed, if you have found consolation, 
i.e. a way to regard the world as still worth living, despite the loss.
Intentionality
In the sense of the above mentioned core definition, the intentionality 
of consolation can be formulated as follows: feeling consolation means 
to experience something in a pleasant way that lowers one’s pain, and 
hence to experience it as valuable for one’s life and well-being. We can 
also illustrate the triad of reference to the world in individual aspects as it 
has become common since Bennett Helm.20 We can talk about an object 
of consolation, which is who or what is consoling; a formal object, which 
is the object’s property to lessen the pain; and a focus, which is one’s own 
pain or misfortune. While the formal object – as the definiens of the type 
of emotion  – is always the same, focus and object of consolation can 
differ. Based on these two variables, I will now outline the varieties in 
which consolation can take place.
III. VARIETIES OF CONSOLATION
3.1. Concrete misfortune or suffering from the whole world
We can, in principle, distinguish between two different possibilities 
concerning the focus of consolation. It is either about a concrete, personal 
misfortune, usually a certain event (or several, as with Job in the bible; 
a  prime example of dealing with unbearable suffering). Or it is about 
a more abstract, existential misfortune – suffering from the world, from 
how it is, from human life as such, of which suffering, ignorance and 
transience are part. These two meanings can also be found in the few 
canonical texts on consolation in ancient philosophy.21 For the first case, 
20 See, e.g., B. Helm, ‘Felt Evaluations. A Theory of Pleasures and Pains’, American 
Philosophical Quarterly, 39, (2002), 13-30 (p. 15).
21 For one of the few philosophical treatments of consolation in modernity, especially 
existential consolation, see: Paul Ricoeur, ‘On Consolation’, in The Religious Significance 
of Atheism, Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, eds. (New York: Columbia University 
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the writings on consolation by Seneca are exemplary.22 Boethius’ piece 
about consolation is an example for the second case.23 It also begins with 
a  concrete misfortune  – the situation of being accused of conspiracy, 
being incarcerated and sentenced to death  – but his thoughts expand 
to the situation of human beings in the world in general. Both variants 
can also be found in theology.24 Traditionally, religion is interested in 
providing humans with consolation about their existence in general. 
Currently, the subject of consolation increasingly centres around 
individual misfortune, although only in the sub-discipline of practical 
theology or its branch of pastoral care.25 In what follows, I will talk about 
varieties of consolation, depending on their intentionality, in the first 
sense, i.e. concerning concrete misfortune.
3.2 Of fellow human beings, art or God
The object of consolation, i.e. what a  suffering person in her emotion 
takes to be an alleviating influence, can be manifold. How, with the help 
of who or what, can she find consolation?
A first thought is: with the help of someone else. When we are sad or 
desperate we often wish for someone on our side and call for someone, if 
possible. We want to talk about our suffering, to share it, we do not want 
to be alone (I  will say more about this consoling and being consoled 
between two persons below).
We can also find consolation in other, not directly human experiences. 
Art can also offer consolation. I mean art in a passive as well as active 
sense here, i.e. as the reception and exercise of art. In general, both can 
Press, 1969), pp. 81-98. The idea of consolation as something dialogical can also be found 
there (p. 90).
22 See Seneca, ‘Trostschrift an Marcia’, pp. 119-158. Other, less well-known ancient 
writers are also mentioned in H.-T. Johann, Trauer und Trost. Eine quellen- und 
strukturanalytische Untersuchung der philosophischen Trostschriften über den Tod 
(Munich: Fink, 1968).
23 Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae - Trost der Philosophie. Lateinisch- deutsch 
(Düsseldorf et al.: Artemis und Winkler, 1998).
24 Two theological studies offer an  overview and some interesting analyses: T. 
Weyhofen, Trost: Modelle des religiösen und philosophischen Trostes und ihre Beurteilung 
durch die Religionskritik (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1983); G. Langenhorst, Trösten 
lernen? Profil, Geschichte und Praxis von Trost als diakonischer Lehr- und Lernprozeß 
(Ostfildern, Schwabenverlag, 2000).
25 See, e.g., S. Rolf, Vom Sinn zum Trost: Überlegungen zur Seelsorge im Horizont einer 
relationalen Ontologie (Münster: Lit, 2003).
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be called engaging with art. This thought, although familiar as a roughly 
understood topos (as one can see, for example, in interpretations of 
music)26 could be explained with a theory of art that understands art as 
a process of self-understanding.27 Engaging with art would then mean 
engaging with oneself, which would mean, in mourning, addressing this 
mourning or, more generally, addressing oneself as a being capable of 
suffering and mourning.
These first two intentional areas of consolation show that the analogy 
with perception in the theory of emotions must not be understood too 
narrowly, as I previously warned. To experience something as consoling 
does not so much mean to realize it as being consoling, but rather that this 
sets a process into motion in oneself. This process is the transformation 
of mourning in which finding consolation consists. Finding consolation 
by the help of another person has much to do with really meeting the 
other person. Finding consolation in art either has something to do 
with becoming aware of oneself in the new situation, and gradually 
restructuring oneself, or it has something to do with a practice, such as 
playing the piano. If you pay less attention to the content of the music, 
but rather see music as an engagement with forms, one can see the move 
here to saying that certain ordered activities can provide consolation. 
How? One thought is that one has ‘fallen out of the world’ or that one 
has, more poetically speaking, ‘become lost for the world’, as expressed in 
the famous Mahler song based on the Rückert poems. Besides practicing 
art, maintaining rituals therefore also belongs to this type of consoling 
activities.
This insight also contains a  link to religious consolation. Religion 
provides many consoling rituals, such as prayer, the rosary, mass, singing, 
etc. Even dividing the year into bank holidays can, as a great rhythm, 
contribute to consolation.28 But consolation can also be experienced by 
26 Franz Schubert’s Streichquintett in C-Dur, D 956, for instance, counts as a prime 
example of a  work about mourning and consolation. Mourning and consolation are 
exemplarily represented in this musical work. The sounds of consolation are not entirely 
different from those of mourning, but resonate in them.
27 Contemporary proponents of this view are, e.g., G. Bertram, . ‘Was die Kunst der 
Philosophie zu denken gibt’, Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 34:1 (2009), 79-98. 
And D.M. Feige, Kunst als Selbstverständigung (Paderborn: Mentis, 2012).
28 For the meaning of ‘rhythm’ as a  religious experience, cf. H. Wettstein, The 
Significance of Religious Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 45f.
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the concrete contents of faith.29 The most prominent example is belief in 
life after death. Generally, the belief in a benevolent God surely also plays 
a central role here. Of course, then one has to face the theodicy question. 
Why does God permit suffering to happen? Someone who has an answer 
to this can find consolation in God. It would be a  further question to 
wonder if, from this religious perspective, any consolation is, in the end, 
given by God, but manifested differently (in a concrete person or in art 
(see below)). This question, however, is not central for the basic idea of 
consolation.
A  classic topos about what can provide consolation is, fourth, 
philosophizing. This is at least the ancient conception of philosophy 
and best-known from the formulations of the late ancient philosopher 
Boethius.30 Of course we have to keep his conception of philosophy in 
mind. For him, philosophy is not only thinking about questions, not only 
wanting to understand and realize. Primarily, philosophy means thinking 
about what is a good life and trying to live accordingly. Boethius’ view is 
also strongly influenced by religious ideas. With philosophy as a process 
of thinking and realization, we allegedly not only arrive at just any 
insights, but at a specific one: the world is basically fine and created out 
of God’s eternal council. So Boethius’ idea of philosophy as consolation 
can, in the end, be understood as a variant of religious consolation. In 
this case, not due to rituals, but due to a specific content of belief, i.e. 
that the world is basically, if we properly look at it and understand it, 
well-designed by God.
At precisely this point, a critique of religion can turn into a critique 
of consolation, as in Nietzsche’s writings in particular.31 If you do not 
agree with the belief in a  world well-designed by God (the best of all 
possible worlds, as Leibniz wrote), then a consolation that is based on 
29 For various forms of religious consolation, see T. Weyhofen, Trost: Modelle des 
religiösen und philosophischen Trostes und ihre Beurteilung durch die Religionskritik 
(Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1983), pp. 249f.
30 Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae. For the following summary of the main 
thoughts of Boethius’ works, I  refer to T. Weyhofen, Trost: Modelle des religiösen und 
philosophischen Trostes und ihre Beurteilung durch die Religionskritik, pp. 124 ff.
31 ‘We have every right to call Christianity in particular a large treasure-trove of the 
most ingenious means of consolation, so much to refresh, soothe and narcotize is piled 
up inside it.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, translated by Carol Diethe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 69.
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such a belief must be wrong.32 The question about the truth of matters 
of faith is one thing and should be treated with care. It is another thing 
whether the emotion of consolation can be criticized. I will only address 
this question, because it belongs to the general explanation of consolation 
(whereas the first point only concerns religious consolation).
Following from what I have said so far, consolation would have to be 
criticized just like any other emotion. Emotions are not true or false, but 
appropriate or inappropriate, and can only be criticized in this respect. 
An  emotion can be inappropriate because it is based on beliefs that 
are simply false. An example would be being consoled by the thought 
that there is an afterlife, when in fact there is no such thing. By now, of 
course, Christian ideas are not necessarily taken that literally. But that is 
a topic in itself. A secular deception would be if you feel consoled after 
a conversation with someone and later learn that this person has made 
fun of you and your mourning. He only pretended what he said in order 
to get his share of the inheritance.
It is more difficult to decide whether an emotional reaction to a state 
of affairs that was correctly understood is appropriate or not. There are 
individual differences, of course. People do not all perceive the same 
thing as consoling. The presence of the best friend might be consoling 
for some people, but not for others. But since one would immediately 
find this to be obviously consoling, someone who feels differently 
has to explain why. Besides the general rules for which emotion we 
find appropriate in which situations, there are always individual rules 
that stem from the individual character and story of life. Perhaps the 
connection to the best friend is so strong that her presence increases the 
mourning, because the sensation is, as it were, doubled by the friend’s 
sympathy. This person rather needs a stranger. One person can also find 
a musical work consoling, whereas someone else thinks that this music 
is kitsch and regards consolation based on the music as inappropriate. 
32 A classic criticism of religion can also be found in Sigmund Freud. Similarly to 
Nietzsche, he criticized religion for its promise of consolation: ‘I disagree with you when 
you conclude that man cannot go without the consolation of religious illusion, that he 
could not bear the burden of life, the gruesome reality. Indeed, not the man who you 
have infused with the sweet – or bitter-sweet – poison from his childhood on. But the 
other one, who grew up sober? Maybe he who is not suffering from the neurosis also 
does not need an intoxication in order to numb it.’ (Translation M.W.) Sigmund Freud, 
‘Die Zukunft einer Illusion’, in Studienausgabe (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1927), IX, 
pp. 137-189 (p. 182).
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In this case, the character and history of the mourning person, her 
experience with music and her associations will also matter. The criterion 
for appropriateness is coherence within the person herself. This idea can 
be explained in more detail by drawing on Bennet Helm and his thesis 
of a structured pattern that connects the emotions, if they refer to the 
same focus. If you love someone, you are happy when he feels good, 
and you are mourning if you lose him, for example. The emotions are 
connected in a structured pattern, since it would be incomprehensible 
if someone – without any further explanation – would be happy about 
seeing a beloved person again, but not mourn at all over his loss.33 This 
pattern and its rules provide a reference point for considering a specific 
emotion – in the context of a person’s other emotions – to be appropriate 
or inappropriate. If you find the musical piece consoling you cannot find 
it scary or trivial the next day, all else being equal, without your emotion 
becoming incomprehensible or open to criticism.
This clarification about the criticizability of emotions is important 
here, because it allows us to contour the difference between consolation 
in the original sense and different ways of dealing with negative 
emotions. Consolation, as I have described it, as an emotion, needs to 
be distinguished from the results of being distracted or being ‘on the 
rebound’. (Especially in German both phenomena are easily mixed up 
because ‘Vertröstung’ seems to be the same as ‘Trost’.) The latter both 
mean to ignore the suffering, to replace the loss by something else or 
to not regard it as severe. To distract someone often means to postpone 
something to a later point of time. But this already implies that there is 
no real hope that this will ever be fulfilled. One is on the rebound and 
knows that one has lost already. Some people try to be on the rebound 
over a  loss by quickly replacing a  partner with a  new one, or just by 
getting drunk and washing the worries away. But all of these are ways 
of not taking a  suffering or mourning seriously, of not dealing with it 
and not integrating it into a life that needs to be reorganized. In the end, 
they are a form of denying suffering, a self-deception. This is precisely 
how consolation, as I describe it here, is not to be understood. They are 
phenomena from the same area – engaging with mourning – but not the 
same phenomena.
33 Helm has argued for this in several places, e.g. B.W. Helm, ‘Emotions as Evaluative 
Feelings’, Emotion Review, 1:3 (2009), 248-255 (pp. 251f.).
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All of the transformations mentioned so far (and possibly more 
varieties of it) would have to be fleshed out in more detail, which would 
be a project on its own. In this paper, which sheds new light on a research 
topic, I only wanted to provide at least a certain overview to show how 
consolation can be understood as an emotion.
To conclude, I want to talk a little more about the variant of consolation 
that was mentioned first, in order to elaborate my thesis of consolation 
as an emotion a bit further. How can people offer consolation to each 
other? Which emotional constitution exactly is the aim here?
3.3 What methods of consoling tell us about consolation
We have to distinguish between at least three methods. They might not 
(maybe never) occur in their pure form, but as a  mixture: listening, 
buoying, presence or being there for someone.34
The method of listening is the easiest to explain and also to practically 
learn. You listen carefully to what the suffering is of someone who is 
looking for consolation. Talking can already be partly relieving. At least 
it opens the space for two people to engage with each other such that 
consolation can be given and received.
But what are the right words that could follow? Especially with severe 
misfortunes, many close people are very afraid of not finding the right 
words and so rather say nothing. But it is more important, says someone 
who is affected by this situation, to try it.35 If you say something, there are 
various possibilities. Although it depends on the individual in question, 
some work better than others. The ones that work can, again, inform us 
about the appropriateness of my thesis that consolation is an emotion, 
34 The following considerations have to be understood as an  independent, more 
general phenomenological analysis, based on the reports by people who are affected 
by suffering as well as the consoling side that can be found in texts on pastoral care 
and others. There is very little empirical-scientific material on this. A small study from 
nursing theory is helpful. F. Gilje and A.-G. Talseth, ‘Mediating Consolation with 
Suicidal Patients’, Nursing Ethics, 14:4 (2007), 546-557. It describes how consolation 
arises between two people. One thing that is emphasized, among others, is listening and 
being present. Also mentioned is a dialogue and opening of two sides, so that you, as it 
were, meet in consolation. In this study, 10 of 18 consoling persons were priests.
35 This is, for instance, what the author Max Dorner, who is suffering from multiple 
sclerosis, says in a  feature of Bayerischer Rundfunk. Available at: <http://www.br.de/
radio/bayern2/sendungen/land-und-leute/troesten-und-getroestetwerden-dorner-108.
html> [accessed 29/08/2014].
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which means a  change of mourning  – an  emotion that builds upon 
mourning.
What does not help at all in this sense is talking about a replacement – 
as if a true loss could simply be replaced (this might be possible with small 
misfortunes, but not with major ones where consolation, in an emphatic 
sense, is required). Not very helpful is relativizing, i.e. saying that things 
are not too bad. What helps is: first and foremost, to acknowledge 
the misfortune as what it is. Then one can point out how life can be 
continued despite or with this loss, or whatever kind of misfortune has 
happened. No concrete suggestions are immediately needed. Saying 
that others have suffered the same can also help, because it shows that 
you are not the only one who has to deal with such a difficult situation. 
Subsequently, it is important to (re-)direct the focus on the good things 
the suffering person still has in her life – not in order to counterbalance 
the misfortune, but to show what her future life, her concerns, her reason 
to live, to act and to feel joy, can be based on, despite the misfortune. 
Consolation does not require a  negation or overcoming of loss, but 
a different adjustment of oneself. An adjustment in which the misfortune 
is no longer determining one’s emotional state, but only one element 
among several important aspects of life.
Of course it is unbelievably difficult when the most important 
thing in life has vanished – when a simple shifting of life’s focus is not 
possible, and there is a gap. The only thing that helps now is building 
up a new perspective from scratch. For this task, it might be important 
to have someone else. Someone else can (despite the initial empathy in 
which the perspective of the misfortune is adopted) help to widen the 
perspective or to ‘lift the eyes’, as it says in the famous consolation psalm 
121,36 beyond the perspective that one had before and that has meant 
everything until now. It might be helpful that another person shows us 
that there are also other ways of being in the world. For ourselves, this 
means in such a situation: that there is a new way of being in the world, 
despite the loss. This does not mean adopting the perspective of someone 
else, but finding one for ourselves. In other (equally metaphorical) words 
this means that one has to find a new emotional home.37
36 ‘I will lift up my eyes unto the hills, from whence cometh my help. My help cometh 
from the LORD, which made heaven and earth.’
37 The notion of ‘being at home’ for the description of consolation is central for the 
study mentioned above by Gilje and Talseth.
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If this idea is so particularly important for consolation, i.e. the capacity 
to look beyond the borders of one’s own ‘world’ that is constituted by 
the emotional dispositions, which, again, are attached to a  (or a  few) 
focal point(s) that determine the direction of the whole – then we can 
also understand why it is not so decisive, as stated before, what is being 
said. It is important that another person is with you, i.e. primarily is 
present, a  fellow human being, as mentioned under the third point of 
the ‘method’. By being present, someone ‘means’ more than ‘saying’: you 
are not alone, you can find a way to live in the world again, despite the 
misfortune, because others are also able to do it in their own way (of 
course, not every way is possible for just anyone – and is surely also not 
the only way).
In this explanation of consolation, which simply starts with inter-
personal consoling, we can see that secular and religious consolation are 
not as different as we might think at first sight. It is obviously decisive for 
the consolation that consists in being consoled by another person that 
there is something ‘beyond our self ’. On a  small scale, this is another 
person. On a  bigger scale, this is maybe the transcendent: something 
that is beyond our visible and perceptible world. At least this fits with 
Levinas, who calls the Other the transcendent.38 This could be a bridge 
between a religious and a secular understanding of consolation. In the 
emotion of consolation, I experience the presence of another existence as 
alleviating my suffering. This experience is the process of transforming 
suffering and mourning into an emotional state that frees my life from 
the stagnation caused by the experience of suffering, and it provides new 
movement for my life. What this ‘other existence’ is can be interpreted 
differently. One obvious possibility would be another person, a  fellow 
human being, the neighbour.
CONCLUSION
I hope to have shown in the three steps that consolation can indeed be 
understood as an emotion. The objections mentioned at the start could 
be refuted, the phenomenon could be reconstructed after the model of 
a philosophical theory of emotions, and the varieties of consolation could 
38 This would have to be shown in more detail in his writings: Emmanuel Levinas, 
Totalité et infini. Essai sur l’exteritorité (The Hague, 1961); Emmanuel Levinas, Autrement 
qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence (The Hague, 1974).
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be secularly and religiously described in their similarities and differences, 
providing us with an insightful account. Only if we regard consolation 
not just as the end of something – i.e. of mourning, desperation and the 
like – but as a genuine state in itself, can we describe the phenomenon 
in detail and compare it with different varieties, based on the analysis of 
the types of reference that occur in it. I hope to have provided an impulse 
for how consolation can be accounted for in the debate about religious 
feelings and further examined with interesting results.
